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Abstract 
This article explicates Spinoza’s terms of self-preservation1 as his philosophical 
view in his book “Ethics”2 (published in 1677), written in a geometrical method. 
Generally, self-preservation refers to attention on the needs or desires of an 
individual self. The term self-preservation is often used simply to denote the attitude 
of caring about one’s own good. It is a view that human beings are always motivated 
by self-preservation, which is a necessity view of life. Spinoza has a broader view 
of the term. He identified self-preservation as the ultimate aim and proper motive 
of morality. His philosophical view of self-preservation is a more enlightened self-
preservation, which shows that acting for one's own self-preservation can also serve 
others. Spinoza emphasized that the concepts of good, virtue, into perfection, have 
a ground in every human being, whilst evil is a condition in which virtue in ordinary 
people is still in its early unfoldment. Ordinary individuals tend not to undergo 
rigorous life and therefore they become preys for their passive emotions. According 
to Spinoza: evil actions are the result of ignorance. Therefore, he emphasized that 
individuals good potentials must be developed. The higher the individual 
understanding is, the more the individual has the power to propel himself from 
within, to enlighten himself, but also to help and bring happiness to others. He 
argued that an individual’s goodness will inspire others to achieve contenment. The 
difference of self-preservation term with other philosophical views of it can be 
observed through his propositions in his “Ethics”. Spinoza’s understanding of the 
importance of self-preservation, by improving one’s rational ability, is an exclusive 
view in his era, and can still be an inspiration to individuals today.  
Keywords: self-preservation, conatus, ignorance, virtue, perfection. 
Introduction 
Throughout the humanities and sciences, and even in our personal lives, the 
idea of self-preservation has played a central role. In the imperative of self-love, 
philosophers have perceived a tacit threat: “the excessive love of one’s self is in 
1 This topic is one of the antologies in Kelly Rogers (ed), Self-Interest, An Anthology of 
Philosophical Perspectives, NY, Routledge, 1997, p. 93-104. 
2 Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order (Latin: Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata), 
usually known as the Ethics, is a philosophical treatise written by Benedict de Spinoza. It was 
first published in 1677. 
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reality the source to each man’s all offences” (Plato, Laws V, 731b)3. But Spinoza, 
a Dutch philosopher who lived in the 17th century had a different philosophical 
point of view on that mattter. As one of a Western philosopher who gave attention 
to this topic, Spinoza as mentioned above, identified self-preservation as the 
ultimate aim and proper motive of morality. Certainly it is required to be considered 
that the views taken on the role of self-preservation in human motivation, is to 
perceive the foundation of virtue. The central question in this writing concerns to 
the extent to which human action is driven by the concern for the self-preservation. 
In general notion human being does not help others for the sake of others, but for 
the benefit of himself. On the contrary, Spinoza had his argument: “self-
preservation is the primary and only foundation of virtue.”4 In his book 'Ethics', he 
discussed this problem in great detail. His propositions concerning self-preservation 
is cited as follows: 
 PART IV PROPOSITION 20 
The more every man endeavors and is able to seek his own advantage, that is, to 
preserve 
his own being, the more he is endowed with virtue. On the other hand, insofar 
as he neglects to preserve what is to his advantage, that is, his own being, to that 
extent he is weak. 
Proof:  Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by man's essence (Def. 8, 
IV); that is, it is defined solely by the conatus whereby man endeavors to persist 
in his own being (Pr. 7, III). Therefore, the more every man endeavors and is able 
to preserve h is own being, the more he is endowed with virtue, and consequently 
(Prs. 4 and 6, III) insofar as he neglects to preserve his own being, to that extent 
he is weak. 
Scholium:  Therefore nobody, unless he is overcome by external causes contrary 
to his own nature, neglects to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve 
his own being. Nobody, I repeat, refuses food or kills himself from the necessity 
of his own nature, but from the constra int of external causes. This can take place 
in many ways. A man kills himself when he is compelled by another who twists 
the hand in which he happens to hold a sword and makes him turn the blade 
against his heart; or when, in obedience to a tyranfs command, he, like Seneca,· 
is compelled to open his veins, that is, he chooses a lesser evil to avoid a greater. 
Or it may come about when unobservable external causes condition a man's 
imagination and affect his body in such a way that the latter assumes a different 
3 Kelly Rogers (ed), 1997, p.1 
4 Diana Burns Steinberg, Spinoza's Ethical Doctrine and the Unity of Human Nature in 
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_the_history_of_philosophy/summary/v022/22.3stein
berg.html, accessed 7 December 2015 
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nature contrary to the previously existing one, a nature whereof there can be no 
idea in mind (Pr. 1 0, III). But that a man from the necessity of is own nature 
should endeavor to cease to exist or to be changed into another form, is as 
impossible 
as that something should come from nothing, as anyone can see with a 
little thought5. 
Baruch Spinoza, one of the first Enlightenment philosophers, was born in 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands (1632-1677). He was born from Sephardic6 
Portuguese Jewish parents, living in the Netherlands due to the Inquisition7. At the 
age of twenty-four he was excommunicated from Jewish community of the 
Netherlands because of his unorthodox views, and he took on the name Benedictus, 
the Latin translation of Baruch, that means the 'blessed.' He lived all his life as a 
lens grinder, and in his spare time he developed one of the most profound 
philosophical systems in Western philosophy. His views, particularly his biblical 
criticism, were different from other philosophers, that some of his works, 
particularly the ”Ethics”, were only published posthumously. 
Spinoza’s Method 
In his “Ethics” Spinoza employed the “geometrical” method, a style of a 
geometrical treatise, with each book comprising a set of definitions, axioms, 
propositions, scholia, and other features that make up the formal apparatus of 
geometry8. In this style, he frequently made references to other parts of his 
argument that plays a supporting role. He then summarized those parts and made it 
the point of his discussion. His aim was to explain that human mind must be 
explicable in terms of the laws of nature. He insisted that ethical properties, which 
he sometimes characterized as human “modes of thinking”, are explicable in terms 
of natural laws9. Through his geometrical method, he attempted to show that the 
constitution of human being follows the order of nature. In his opinion, the laws 
and rules of nature, according to which all things take place, and change from one 
form to another, are always and everywhere the same. He also believed that human 
5 Part IV Proposition 20,  in Spinoza, de Baruch, Spinoza Complete Works, ( transl. Samuel 
Shirley), Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 2002, p. 331-332. 
6 Sephardic is Jews of Spain and Portugal or their descendants, distinguished from the 
Ashkenazim and other Jewish communities chiefly by their liturgy, religious customs, and 
pronunciation of Hebrew: after expulsion from Spain and Portugal in 1492, established 
communities in North Africa, the Balkans, Western Europe, and elsewhere. 
7 An official investigation, esp. one of a political or religious nature, characterized by lack of 
regard for individual rights, prejudice on the part of the examiners, and recklessly cruel 
punishments. 
8 http://www.iep.utm.edu/spinoza/#H2, accessed 3 Desember 2015. 
9 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-psychological/, accessed 15 November. 
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beings are not “outside nature” 10. He argued that any features or deeds of human 
beings, must have some explanation in terms of the natural laws. 
In short, Spinoza stated his view that all things must be understood to follow 
the laws of nature. Human beings are under the principles of causal laws. Similar 
in kind to other ordinary objects, in his term “finite modes”11, they ought to be 
analyzed and understood in the same way as the rest of nature. According to 
Spinoza, there is a right, rational ends to pursue, or a continuance to the end, or 
perseverance in being. Everything in nature leads to perfection. But there is also 
wrong, irrational ends. In this way, he saw moral concepts are not different from 
the laws of nature. His book “Ethics” was his attempt to show that moral concepts, 
such as the concepts of good and evil, virtue, and perfection, have a ground in 
human nature.  
God 
Spinoza’s intention in his ”Ethics” was to provide a unified explanation of 
all things within a naturalistic framework. One point that was discussed in his 
philosophical system, was the concept of God. In his thought, God is not identified 
as a 'supreme being' that constitutes the world, but God is nature itself12. Spinoza 
argued that natural world is a single substance, where anything can be observed, 
including human beings, as aspects of nature. According to one of his proposition, 
"each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (Ethics, part 
3, prop. 6)13. Each particular thing is an expression of God’s substance. This means 
that each thing expresses the power of God in a particular way. Human beings and 
nature must be unified under a consistent set of laws. God and nature are the same, 
God is nature, and human beings are an integral part of it14. He believed that all 
aspects of natural world, including human beings were expressions of the eternal 
substance of God, and can therefore only be known through pure thought or reason. 
In his “Ethics”, God is illustrated in a geometrical style: 
10 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-psychological/, accessed 15 November. 
11  James G. Lennox, The Causality of Finite Modes in Spinoza's "Ethics", Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), pp. 479-500. 
12 "From God's supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely many 
modes, that is, all things, have necessarily flowed, or always follow, by the same necessity and 
in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that 
its three angles are equal to two right angles" (IP17S1). The entire modal system, Natura 
naturata, follows immanently from the divine nature, Natura naturans, in 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/spinoza/#SSH3b.i, accessed 20 November 2015. 
13 III Prop. 6, in Spinoza, de Baruch, 2002, p. 283 
14 I Proposition 34:   God's power is his very essence. Proof: From the sole necessity of God's 
essence it follows that God is self-caused (Pr. I I ) and the cause of all th ings (Pr. 16 and 
Cor.). Therefore, God's power, whereby he and all things are and act, is his very essence. in 
Spinoza, de Baruch, 2002, p.238 
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 PART I PROPOSITION 5 
The existence of God is known solely {rom the consideration of his nature. 
Proof : To say that something is contained in the nature or concept of a thing is 
the same as to say that it is true of that thing (Def. 9). But necessary existence is 
contained in the concept of God (Ax. 6). Therefore it is true to say of God that 
there is necessary existence in him, or that he exists " 
Scholium: From this proposition there follow many important consequences. 
Indeed, on this fact alone- that existence pertains to the nature of God, or that 
the concept of God involves necessary existence j ust as the concept of a triangle 
involves its three angles being equal to two right angles, or that his existence, just 
like h is essence, is an eternal truth - depends almost all knowledge of the attributes 
of God through which we are brought to love of him and to the highest 
blessedness. Therefore it is much to be desired that mankind should come round 
to our opinion on this subject15. 
PART III PROPOSITION 6 
The existence of God is proved a posteriori from the mere fact that the idea of him 
is in us. 
Proof: The objective reality of any of our ideas requires a cause in which that 
same reality is contained not just objectively but formally or eminently (Ax. 9). 
Now we do have the idea of God (Defs. 2 and 8), and the objective reality of this 
idea is not contained in us either formally or eminently (Ax. 4), nor can it be 
contained 
in anyth ing other than God himself (Def. 8). Therefore th is idea of God, 
which is in us, requires God for its cause, and therefore God exists (Ax. 7) .'4 
Scholium: There are some who deny that they have any idea of God, and yet, 
as they declare, they worship and love him. And though you were to set before 
them the definition of God and the attributes of God, you will meet with no more 
success than if you were to labor to teach a man blind from birth the differences 
of colors as we see them. However, except to consider them as a strange type of 
creature halfway between man and beast, we should pay small heed to their words. 
How else, I ask, can we show the idea of some thing than by giving its definition 
and explaining its attributes? Because this is what we are doing in the case of the 
idea of God, there is no reason for us to be concerned over the words of men who 
deny the idea of God simply on the grounds that they cannot form an image of 
15 Part 1, Proposition 5, in Spinoza, de Baruch, 2002, p. 133, 134 
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him in their brain.16. 
Conatus 
The term 'conatus' plays an important role in the philosophy of Spinoza. It 
expresses his point of view that everything has an inherent tendency toward self-
preservations and activities. According to Spinoza, all living creatures are 
controlled by an 'inner force', called conatus, which maintains the existence and 
behaviour of all beings. In his thought, conatus means the force in every animate 
creature toward the preservation of its existence.Spinoza argues that all finite modes 
strive to persevere in being (IIIp6). He used an analysis of human’s striving to 
explain desire, human freedom, good and evil in terms that might apply to any finite 
modes. A proposition of conatus will be given below in III Proposition 6:  
PART III PROPOSITION 6 
Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being. 
Proof: Particular things are modes whereby the attributes of God are expressed 
in a definite and determinate way (Cor. Pr. 2 5,, I), that is (Pr. 34, I), they are things 
which express in a definite and determinate way the power of God whereby he is 
and acts, and no thing can have in itself anything by which it can be destroyed, 
that is, which can annul its existence (Pr. 4, III). On the contrary, it opposes 
everything 
that can annul its existence (preceding Pr.); and thus, as far as it can and as 
far as it is in itself, it endeavors to persist in its own being17. 
In Spinoza’s opinion, conatus is the essence, the highest principle. It is the 
drive for self-preservation in all living things impulses. It is a principle that can be 
applied to nature’s objects. Conatus has psychological connotations as well. In 
human beings, the drive to pursuit happiness is also included in the self-
preservation. It is stated in his “Ethics” that happiness contains in human capacity 
to preserve itself. This endeavor, according to Spinoza can also be seen as the 
foundation of virtue.. Happiness means alignment with conatus, and consequently 
an individual faces sadness when he opposes his conatus.  
On the concept of conatus, a central theme in his philosophy, Spinoza based 
his system of moral principles. Striving is "nothing but the actual essence of the 
16 Part III, Proposition 6, Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, in Baruch de Spinoza, 2002, p. 
134-135. 
17 Part III, Proposition 6, in Baruch de Spinoza, 2002, p. 283. 
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thing" (Ethics, part 3, prop.7)18. Feelings and emotions are qualities of the living 
things. Human passions, desires and their varieties are forms of striving itself. 
Changes in this qualities mean the increase or decrease in the power of striving. 
Active affections are the increase in the power with which living things strive. On 
the contrary passiveness are the decrease in the power, which is against the conatus. 
PART III PROPOSITION 7 
The conatus' with which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing 
but the actual essence of the thing itself 
Proof: From the given essence of a thing certain things necessarily follow (Pr. 
36, I), nor do things effect anything other than that which necessarily follows from 
their determinate nature (Pr. 29, I). Therefore, the power of any thing, or the 
conatus 
with which it acts or endeavors to act, alone or in conjunction with other 
things, that is (Pr. 6, 1II), the power or conatus by which it endeavors to persist in 
its own being, is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing19. 
This inward disposition was introduced in his primary affects, desire, at 
IIIp9s, after introducing the doctrine of human striving or in his term, the appetite. 
In the context of striving, Spinoza showed how the universal striving doctrine can 
be the basis for an account of human desire. His thesis designated that the essence 
of any finite mode, including any human mind, is striving. To persevere is an 
attempt to give an account of nature, as described his “Ethics” . Spinoza's 
psychology is grounded in his physics and in the conception of conatus, the striving 
of each being to persevere and to manifest its essence. It is the dynamic element in 
Spinoza's vitalistic conception of nature. In human beings, the conatus takes on 
certain predictable psychological features. Ultimately, people seek to satisfy 
desires, feel joy and pleasure, and enhance their well-being, and these goals require 
increasing harmonious activity within nature and the diminishing of the possions, 
which mark a person's 
subordination to beings external to it and failure to satisfy its own preservation. This 
goal requires as complete and perfect a knowledge of nature as one can attain, a 
knowledge that corresponds in the mind to the maximizing of life enhancing 
physical states on the body's part20. 
18 Part III, Proposition 7,  in Baruch de Spinoza, 2002, p. 283. 
19 Part III, Proposition 7, in Baruch de Spinoza, 2002, p. 283. 
20 Introduction in Ethics, in Baruch de Spinoza, 2002, p. 214 
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According to Spinoza, all living things, human actions and thought, are 
under a lawful necessary mode. All is acting or living according to the law of nature 
that Spinoza called God. Thus the whole is determinated. The principle of 
determination can be applied on the whole substance of nature . The result of the 
law of determination is that the whole substance of nature, including ordinary 
human beings in general, as an aspect of it, do not have 'free will'. There is no 
freedom in the physical objects. All things including human actions,, 
are determined according nature’s laws. He demonstrated that ‘only one substance, 
with infinite attributes, exists’; it does so necessarily, and every mode that follows 
from it occurs with precise and necessary determination. This one eternal, 
necessary, determinate substance is God, and hence nature is either identical to it 
or to a certain ways an understanding of it’21, as demonstrated below: 
  PART II PROPOSITION 16 
Every body that moves in a circle (e.g., a stone in a sling) is continuously 
determined 
to continue in motion at a tangent to that circle. 
Proof: A body that moves in a circle is continuously prevented by an external 
force from continuing to move in a straight line (Cor. previous Prop. ). If this force 
ceases, the body will of itself proceed to move in a straight line (Prop. 1 5). 
Furthermore, 
I say that a body that moves in a circle is determined by an external 
cause to proceed to move at a tangent to the circle. If you deny this, suppose that 
a stone at B is determined (e.g., by a sling) to move not along the tangent BD but 
along another line conceived as drawn without or within the circle from the same 
point. When the sling is supposed to be coming from L toward B, let this line be 
BF. If on the other hand the sling is supposed to be coming from C toward B, let 
this line be BG. If BH is the line drawn from the center through the circumference, 
which it cuts at B, I understand the angle GBH to be equal to the angle 
FBH. But if the stone at B is determined to proceed to move toward F by the sling 
moving in a circle from L toward B, then it necessarily 
follows (Ax. 1 8) that when the sling 0 
moves with a contrary determination from C toward 
B, the stone will be determined to proceed 
to move in line with BF with a contrary determination 
and will therefore tend not toward G but 
21 Baruch de Spinoza, 2002, p. 214. 
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toward K. This is contrary to our hypothesis. And 
because no line except a tangent can be drawn 
through point B making equal adjacent angles, 
DBH, ABH, with the l ine BH,4 there can be no 
line but a tangent that can preserve the same hypothesis, whether the sling moves 
from L to B or from C to B. And so the stone can tend to move along no line but 
the tangent. Q.E.D22. 
Freedom 
Although human actions are determined according to the laws of nature, 
Spinoza argued that in the essence, each individual is not a restricted entity. 
Therefore, every advanced individual can achieve 'freedom' from the determination. 
Freedom means free from the confinement of the determination. Advanced human 
beings actions are free in the sense that they can overcome the constrain or the 
working of external forces or impulses. Whilst in everyday life, ordinary individuals 
are ignorant of the determination of nature. The freedom of attitude closes to the 
ability to understand, to have the true understanding of nature. In the free minds of 
advanced individuals, each of their respective consciousness can take their 
respective liberty to arise, and an individual is then be able to understand adequately 
the causes behind his own ideas and behavior. The individual knows how to 
distinguish an adequate idea, a true idea (ideatum), from untruthfulness, that 
consists of inadequate ideas. Inadequate ideas are fragmented and confused ideas23. 
Spinoza wrote that conscious mind tends to seek clear and distinct ideas. This effort 
frees an advanced individual from the 'bondage' of life. In Spinoza’s opinion, the 
higher the individual understanding is, the more the individual has power to propel 
himself from within. The proposition in the appendix containing metaphysical 
thoughts, part I, chapter 4,  shows how to achieve freedom: 
[To reconcile the freedom of our will with God's predestination surpasses human 
understanding. ] As to the freedom of the human will, which we asserted to be free 
in Schol. Prop. 1 5 Part I,, this too is preserved by the concurrence of God, nor 
does any man will or perform anything except what God has decreed from eternity 
that he should will or perform. How this can be while saving human freedom 
is beyond our capacity to understand. Yet we must not reject what we clearly 
perceive 
because of what we do not know, for if we attend to our nature, we clearly 
and distinctly understand that we are free in our actions, and that we reach 
decisions 
on many th ings simply on account of our will to do so. Again, if we attend 
to the nature of God, as we have just shown, we clearly and distinctly perceive that 
22 Part 2, Proposition 16, in Baruch de Spinoza, 2002, p.160-161. 
23 Kelly Rogers (ed), 1997, fn. p. 278. 
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all things depend on him, and that nothing exists except that whose existence God 
has decreed from eternity. But how the human will continues to be created by 
God at every moment in such a way as to remain free, we do not know. For there 
are many things that exceed our grasp and that nevertheless we know to have been 
brought about by God -for example, the real division of matter into indefinite 
particles, clearly demonstrated by us in Prop. 11 Part 2, although we do not know 
how that division comes about24. 
2010.03.1 
Self-Preservation is a Moral Virtue 
What human beings desire to do is, according to Spinoza,  to obtain 
perseverance, to secure their existence to the end25. It is said in the description above 
that the quality of an individual mind, such as desire or appetite, can be seen as 
human striving to live. There is no difference between appetite and desire, except 
that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetite. 
So desire can be defined as appetite as well as consciousness of the appetite. Self-
preservation in the form of human desire is a part of the striving for perseverance. 
As previously described, self-preservation is the primary and only foundation of 
virtue. The view of most people, most of their time, consciously desire for their own 
benefit. But part IV proposition 36, 37 suggests that Spinoza hold a different kind 
of view: 
PROPOSITION 36 
The highest good of those who pursue virtue is common to all, and all can equally 
enjoy it. 
Proof : To act from virtue is to act by the guidance of reason (Pr. 24, IV), and 
whatever we endeavor to do in accordance with reason is to understand (Pr. 26, 
IV). So (Pr. 28, IV) the highest good of those who pursue virtue is to know God; 
that is (Pr. 47, II and Sch.) a good that is common to all men and can be possessed 
equally by all men insofar as they are of the same nature. 
Scholium:  Somebody may ask: "What if the h ighest good of those who pursue 
virtue were not common to all? Would it not then follow, as above (Pr. 34, IV), 
that men who live by the gUidance of reason, that is (Pr. 3 5 , IV), men insofar as 
they agree in nature, would be contrary to one another?" Let him take this reply, 
that it arises not by accident but from the very nature of reason that men's highest 
24 Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts, Part I, Chapter 4,  in Baruch de Spinoza, 2002, 
p. 185.
25 Michael LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence, Oxford UP, 
2010, p. 253 in Eugene Marshall (reviewer), electronic journal Notre Dame Philosophical 
Reviews, accessed 3 December 2015. 
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good is common to all, because th is is deduced from the very essence of man 
insofar as that is defined by reason, and because man could neither be nor be 
conceived 
if he did not have the abil ity to enj oy this highest good. For it belongs to 
the essence of the human mind (Pr. 47, II) to have an adequate knowledge of the 
eternal and infinite essence of God. 
PROPOSITION 37 
The good which every man who pursues virtue aims at for himselfhe will also desire 
for the rest of mankind, and all the more as he acquires a greater knowledge of 
God. 
Proof Insofar as men live by the guidance of reason, they are most useful to man 
(Cor. I , Pro 3 5 , IV), and so (Pr. 1 9 , IV) by the gUidance of reason we shall 
necessarily 
endeavor to bring it about that men should l ive by the guidance of reason. 
But the good that every man who l ives according to the dictates of reason, that is 
(Pr. 24, IV), who pursues virtue, seeks for himself is to understand (Pr. 26, IV). 
Therefore the good which every man who pursues virtue seeks for himselfhe will 
also desire for the rest of mankind. Aga in, desire, insofar as it is related to mind, 
is the very essence of mind (Def. of Emotions 1 ). Now the essence of mind consists 
in knowledge (Pr. I I , II) which involves the knowledge of God (Pr. 47, II), 
without which (Pr. 1 5 , I) it can neither be nor be conceived. So the more the 
essence of the mind involves knowledge of God, the greater the desire with which 
he who pursues virtue desires for another the good wh ich he seeks for himself26. 
According to his thought, particular things are expressions of power, they 
derive from God’s attributes and God’s attributes constitute God’s essence and 
God’s essence is His power, the eternal power of God. Because all particular things 
in Spinoza’s philosphy are about expressions of God, the expressions of power, 
potentially they must have derivations of God’s quality. The power that a genuine 
particular thing expresses, and directed towards its own perseverance, has 
potentially divine quality. To actualize this potentiality and to turn it into action or 
fact, Spinoza suggested that an individual can do it through his knowledge of true 
and adequate ideas. The conatus would lead an individual to a rational direction, 
and would inspire him to cultivate wisdom. Spinoza stated that each one, from his 
own affection, and proper judgement can perceive clearly what is good and what is 
evil27. According to Spinoza, nothing is more useful than that which brings man to 
higher understanding. In his thinking, the higher the knowledge is achieved by an 
individual, the greater the wisdom he gains.  
26 Part IV, Proposition 36 &37,  in Baruch de Spinoza, 2002, p. 338-339 
27 Spinoza”s Psychological Theory, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in Stanford 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-psychological. 
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Spinoza emphasized in his “Ethics”, that the idea of goodness has a 
metaphysical connotation. The highest good in human being means his ability to 
know a substance of God. In IV Proposition 20 he wrote: “The more each one 
strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, i.e., to preserve his being, the more 
he is endowed with virtue; conversely, insofar as each one neglects his own 
advantage, i.e., neglects to preserve his own being, he lacks power”28. Spinoza 
specified that striving for perseverance is identical with conatus, the essential drive 
of all beings. Trying to preserve oneself is right, and neglecting to preserve oneself 
is wrong. It is an effort to achieve higher goals, in his terms it is a greater perfection. 
An increased power to persevere is, according to Spinoza, a transition to a greater 
perfection, and it is a goodness. On the contrary, the decreased power is a transition 
to lesser perfection and it is an evil.  
As stated before, Spinoza believed that all essential aspects of nature, 
including human beings are expressions of the eternal substance of God, and can 
therefore be known only through pure thought or reason. The description above 
shows that in Spinoza’s philosophy, an individual reaches the faculty of wisdom 
when he is in harmony with the laws of nature, with his conatus, because the nature 
of human being is to strive for the preservation of the individual self. To behave in 
accordance with the principle is preserving the existence of the self. Therefore, in 
Spinoza’s opinion, the definition of 'self-preservation' is not in contrast with 
nature’s principle. Spinoza’s philosophy of 'self-preservation' is in fact the basis of 
goodness. It is an individual effort to achieve a higher purpose that is obtained 
through understanding. When an individual can free himself from the determination 
of his lower innate impulses, he will reach contentment.  
The actualization of one’s potentials in this regard is achieved through 
reasoning of adequate ideas, the ideatum of the essence of nature, that liberates the 
individual from his inadequate ideas. The understanding of the essence of nature is 
reached through rationalization. An individual has to strive to achieve fulfilment. 
Spinoza defined self-preservation in his philosophy as how an individual achieves 
self-actualization. He explained that individuals who live their lives in accordance 
with nature and rationality, will find fulfilment. Because the whole is an expression 
of God, then to improve one’s awareness of individual self, is to be in alignment 
with nature and it means awareness of others. The individual who is guided by 
reason will reach human perfection.  
Spinoza’s thought of self-preservation is not a common thought and can 
easily be distinguished from other philosophers point of views. His view of self-
preservation should be more understood as self-introspection. His thought that all 
human existence is guided by the conatus, is also a driving force to move 
individuals towards certain goals of self-realization. Despite of the complexity of 
Spinoza’s philosophy, his notion of self-preservation as mentioned above can be 
considered as a guide in individual life. 
28 Don Garrett (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, Cambridge, Cambridge Univerity 
Press, 1996, p. 276. 
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